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Market Allocation  Rules  for Nonprice
Promotion with Farm Programs: U.S.  Cotton
Lily  Ding  and Henry W.  Kinnucan
Rules  are  derived  to  indicate  the  optimal  allocation  of a  fixed  promotion  budget
between  domestic  and export markets  when  the commodity  in question represents  a
significant portion  of world trade  and is  protected  in the  domestic  market by  a defi-
ciency-payment  program.  Optimal  allocation  decisions  are  governed  by advertising
elasticities  in the  domestic  and  export markets  and the export market  share.  Promo-
tion's  ability  to  lower deficiency  payments  is  inversely related  to the  absolute value
of  demand  elasticities  in  the  domestic  and  export  markets  and  directly  related  to
advertising elasticities  and  certain policy  parameters.  The empirical application  sug-
gests subsidies for nonprice  export promotion  may be efficiency  increasing in  a sec-
ond-best sense. That is, the heightened  subsidies associated with the Targeted Export
Assistance  program  and  the  Market  Promotion  Program  appear  to  have  corrected
allocative errors  that favored  domestic market promotion.
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Introduction
Nonprice promotion of food and fiber products by farm groups has become  a prominent
feature of American agriculture,  thanks to federal legislation  authorizing nationwide man-
datory checkoff programs  and  increased  subsidies  for export promotion.  In  1989 Amer-
ican farmers  spent  nearly  $700  million on promotion,  research,  and nutrition  education
to strengthen  the demand for their products in  domestic and export markets  (Forker and
Ward,  p.  106).  Federal  subsidies  for nonprice  export promotion  grew from  $20  million
in  1982  to  $234  million  in  1992  before  declining  to  the  current  (1995)  level  of  $105
million (Kinnucan and Ackerman,  p.  123).  Yet despite the large investments in domestic
and export promotion by industry and government,  and growing evidence that promotion
can indeed  increase  demand  (Ferrero  et  al.),  scant  attention  has been  paid to  decision
rules  to guide promotion policy.
Early  work by Dorfman and Steiner (D-S) and by Nerlove  and Waugh (N-W) remains
the theoretical  foundation  for optimal advertising  decisions.  The D-S  and N-W models,
however,  assume  a  single  market  and,  thus,  are  silent  on the  issue  of fund  allocation
across  markets.  Goddard,  Griffith,  and  Quilkey  extend  the  D-S  and  N-W  models  to
multiple-market  situations but do not consider  the impacts of government  programs, the
major focus of this  article.  Kinnucan, Duffy, and Ackerman consider the relative impacts
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of price  reduction  versus  promotion  in  the export  market for  an industry  protected  by
deficiency  payments  but  do  not consider  the  relative  effectiveness  of domestic  versus
export  promotion.  Discussing  commodity  promotion  from  a  small  open-economy  per-
spective, Alston,  Carman,  and Chalfant consider  farm programs but do not develop  spe-
cific  optimization  rules to guide fund allocation  decisions.
The  purpose  of this  research  is  to  determine  optimal  market  allocation  rules  for  a
commodity that is traded in international markets  but is protected in the domestic market
by  a  deficiency-payment  scheme.  The  allocation  issue  is  important  because,  in  a  large
open-economy  situation, promotion affects treasury outlays for deficiency payments. The
nexus between deficiency payments and promotion suggests treasury savings  are possible
if funds  are  allocated to  minimize  the combined  cost of promotion  and protection.
The analysis  proceeds by  first specifying  an equilibrium-displacement  model to  indi-
cate  the  price  effects  of increased  promotion  in  a  competitive  market  protected  by  a
deficiency  payment  scheme.  The  model's  reduced-form  relationships  are  then  incorpo-
rated  into  the  first-order  conditions  of a  cost-minimization  problem  to  derive  the  allo-
cation rules.  The allocation  rules are  applied to  the U.S. cotton industry  to  demonstrate
usefulness  and to  determine  whether  historic  fund allocations  are  efficient  from a  cost-
minimization  perspective.
Basic  Model
The basic model assumes competitive  market clearing  and a single price  in the domestic
and export markets,  that is,  the law  of one-price  is assumed to hold.  Quantity  demanded
in the domestic  and export  markets  is assumed to be  a decreasing  function of price  and
an increasing function of promotion.  Domestic production,  which is entirely allocated to
the  domestic  and  export  markets  through  the  market  mechanism,  is  assumed  to be  an
increasing  function of the  "supply-inducing  price"  (to be defined  later). The promoting
country  is assumed  to have  sufficient market presence  to affect  price  (large open-econ-
omy assumption).  Initial equilibrium  is described  as follows:
(1)  Qd  = f(P,  Ad)  (domestic  demand),
(2)  Qx = g(P, A,)  (export demand),
(3)  Q  = h(P,)  (domestic  supply),
(4)  Qs  = Qd  +  Qx  (equilibrium  quantity),  and
(5)  Ps  = OPT  +  (1  - ()P  (supply-inducing  price),
where  Qd is quantity demanded  in the  domestic market;  Q, is  quantity demanded  in the
export  market;  Q5 is  the promoting  country's  total  supply;  P is  the market  price  of the
promoted  commodity;  PT  is the  target price;  Ps is  the  supply-inducing  price;  Ad  is  ad-
vertising  in the domestic market;  and Aj  is  advertising  in the export  market.
The  above  system consists of five equations  in five endogenous  variables:  Q5, P,  Qd,
Q,  and P.  The  target  price,  PET  which  is  set  by  government,  is  exogenous.  For  the
purposes  of this  analysis,  following  Nerlove  and  Waugh,  we  treat advertising  as  an ex-
ogenous  variable.1 The  supply-inducing  price  is  defined  as  a  weighted  average  of the
' Technically,  initial equilibrium  is conditioned  by exogenous  variables not  explicitly included in the model (e.g.,  consumer
income in  the demand equations  and technology  in  the supply equation). For  brevity, these variables  are deleted, as  they are
irrelevant to  the analysis.
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market  price  P  and  the  target  price  P,. The  weighting  factor  b [see  (5)]  reflects  the
proportion of total production eligible  for deficiency  payments and,  thus,  is bounded on
the  unit  interval.  A  maintained  hypothesis  is  that  the  deficiency-payment  program  is
binding,  that is,  P,  > P.
Changes  in  quantities  can  be  approximated  linearly  by  substituting  (5)  into  (3)  and
totally  differentiating  the resulting  equations,  which  when  converted  to  elasticities  and
relative  changes, yields
(la)  dln Qd =-NddlnP  + Bddln Ad,
(2a)  d In Qx  = -N,  d In P  + B,  d In Ax,
(3a)  d In Q,  = E  d ln P,  and
(4a)  d  In Q  = Kdd InQd + K  d  In Q,
where d In Z =  dZIZ denotes  the relative  change  in  variable  Z. The parameters  Nd  and
N,  are  demand  elasticities  in  the  domestic  and  export markets,  respectively;  Bd  and  B.
indicate the percent  change in  demand in  the domestic and  export  market, respectively,
associated with  a one percent  change  in promotion,  hereafter referred to as  "advertising
elasticities."  The  Kd  and  Kx  parameters  represent,  respectively,  the  proportion  of total
supply  allocated  to the  domestic and export  markets.
The E  parameter is the  supply elasticity for the promoted  commodity.  It is multiplied
by a scaling factor,  e =  (1  - 4)P/[4PT +  (1  - O)P], which reflects the effect of program
provisions  on supply  response.2 In particular,  if all  acres  are eligible  for payments  and
all  producers  participate  in  the  program,  b  =  1.  In  this  case,  - =  0  and  supply  is
unresponsive  to price.  More  generally,  some producers  elect not to participate  and  pro-
gram provisions  restrict eligibility, so 0  <  5 <  1 and  supply is responsive to changes  in
market price.
The  reduced-form  equation  for  domestic  price  is  obtained  by  substituting  equations
(la)-(3a)  into (4a),  which yields
(6)  d In P  =  (KdBdID)d In Ad  + (KBjID) d In A,,
where D = (EN + KdNd  + KNX). Equation (6) is a reduced-form relationship that indicates
the effect  of an increase  in promotion on price,  taking into account  supply response and
the price-induced  feedback  effects  between the markets.  Equation  (6)  yields  the hypoth-
esis that promotion's  price-enhancement  ability is directly related to the advertising  elas-
ticities  in  the  two  markets  and  inversely  related  to  the  absolute  value  of  the  demand
elasticities,  the supply  elasticity,  and policy parameters affecting  eligibility  and program
participation.  For  example,  if  program  participation  is  complete  and  all  production  is
eligible  for deficiency  payments,  5  =  0 and  increased  promotion  has  a relatively  large
impact  on market  price.  The inverse  relationship  between  demand elasticities  and  pro-
motion  effectiveness  is  consistent  with  the Dorfman-Steiner  theorem  and the  Nerlove-
Waugh model. Under the stated assumptions, D > 0; thus, increases in domestic or export
2 To derive  t, first  take the total differential  of equation (5):  dP, = (1 - )  dP + p dPT. Setting dPT = 0 (PT is exogenous),
this  equation  can  be  reexpressed  as  (dPiP,)P,  =  (1 - )P(dPIP).  Dividing  both  sides  by  P,  and  writing  the  resulting
expression  in  logarithmic  form gives  d In  P,  =  (1 - )(PIP,) d  In P.  Substituting  (5) for P, yields d In  P, =  d In P, where
=  (1 - O)P/[  PT  + (1 - )P].
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promotion always  increase  price, assuming  that promotion  does  indeed shift the respec-
tive demand curve,  that is, B,  > 0 and  Bx  > 0.
The reduced-form  equation for  quantity  is obtained  by substituting  equation  (6)  into
(3a),  which yields
(7)  d In Qs  = (E KWB/D) d In Ad  +  (EKxBxID) d In Ax.
Equation  (7)  yields the  hypothesis  that  as  long  as  supply  is upward  sloping,  and  some
production remains outside the program, increases in promotion  always increase quantity.
However, if all  production is covered  by deficiency payments  and  PT > P,  as  assumed,
increases in  promotion affect  price but not quantity.
Allocation  Rules
With  the  necessary  reduced-form  expressions  in  hand,  it is  now  possible  to  derive  op-
timality conditions  to guide promotion allocation  decisions.  In so doing, we assume that
the  goal  is to  minimize  the  combined  cost of promotion  and  protection.  Cost  minimi-
zation  is  compatible  with  rent  maximization  under  a  variety  of conditions  (Kinnucan,
Duffy, and Ding). Moreover,  if the deficiency-payment  program  is binding,  a maintained
hypothesis  in this  study, the primary  beneficiary  of promotion is the  taxpayer.  Producer
benefits  are  nil  (see  footnote  11)  if the  market  price  remains  below  the  target  price
following  an increase  in promotion.  In this case,  a  sensible  goal is to find the allocation
that maximizes  taxpayer  welfare.3
The objective  is to choose Ad,  AX,  and A such that the following function is minimized:
(8)  L =  b(PT-  TP)QS + A,  + AX + A(A
°- A  - Ax),
where L is  the Lagrange  function;  A,  is the promotion  budget,  inclusive of the  subsidy
for export promotion;  A is the Lagrange  multiplier;  and  r is a  "fudge"  factor (less than
one)  used in  the  calculation  of the  per-unit  deficiency  payment.4 The  first  term in  (8)
reflects  direct treasury  outlays for deficiency  payments;  the  second  and third terms  (Ad
and Ax)  reflect combined industry and treasury outlays of promotion;  and the fourth term
expresses the budget constraint.  (Treasury outlays  for promotion,  which are restricted to
the export  market,  appear  in the Ax term.)
The allocation  of A°  that minimizes  the combined  cost of protection and promotion is
determined  by partially differentiating  (8)  with respect to the three  choice variables  and
setting each derivative to zero (the second-order sufficiency conditions  are derived in the
appendix):
3 A more  encompassing  objective  would  take into account  the welfare  impacts  of increased  promotion on consumers  and
foreign producers.  To keep  things simple  and to highlight the interplay between  promotion and protection,  we chose to limit
the analysis  to taxpayer  impacts.
4 The fudge factor is specified  to account  for the fact that the  market price for cotton reported by  the USDA is generally
higher than the market price used to calculate the per-unit deficiency payment.  The differences apparently stem from "seasonal
adjustment"  procedures  applied to the market price for deficiency-payment  purposes.
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(9)  aL  - Ad  = -rT-d  Qs  +  k(P  P)  +  - =  0,
aAd  aAP  aAdQ
(10)  A  = - AQ~  +  (PT- 
TP)-a  +  1 - A =  0, aAx  JA,  3A,.
and
(11)  =  -L  = A,-Ad-  A  =0.
dA
Expressing (9)  in elasticity form yields
Ad  d In P  d In Qs (I - A)d
= OP  - (PT  -r f P)
Q(  1  d In A  d In Ad
Substituting equations  (6)  and  (7)  into the above  equation yields
(12)  (1  - A)Vd  =  dC,
where  Vd  = AId(QsP) is the  domestic advertising  intensity,  and  C  =  r-  EG(PT - P)/
P.  Similar manipulation  of (10)  yields
K(B1
(13)  (1  - A)V  =  C,
where  Vx  = AI/QP) is export advertising  intensity.
Substituting  (12)  and  (13)  into (11) yields
(14)  (l  -A)VT=KdBd  + K
D
where  VT  =  Vd  +  Vx  = (Ad  + Ax)/(QsP) is total advertising  intensity.
In fact,  dividing (12)  and (13)  by (14),  the optimality conditions  for Ad and AX  can be
simplified to:
(15a)  A*  =  ATKdBd/(KdBd  +  KBx),  and
(15b)  A*  = AOKxBx/(KdBd  +  KBx),
where A*  is the optimal allocation to the domestic market and A*  is the optimal allocation
to the  export market.  Equations  (15a)  and  (15b)  indicate  the  allocation  of a fixed  pro-
motion budget  (AOT)  that minimizes  the combined  cost  of promotion  and  protection  for
an industry protected by deficiency  payments.
The rules indicate  that  allocations  are  independent  of supply response,  demand elas-
ticities, and policy parameters.  All that matters  in allocation decisions is the relative size
of the  advertising  elasticities  in the  two markets  and  the export  share.  Assuming equal
market  shares,  the  market  that  is more  responsive  to  promotion  receives  the  larger  al-
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location.  Conversely,  if both  markets  are  equally  responsive  to  promotion,  the  larger
market gets the larger  allocation.5
Demand and  supply  elasticities and  policy parameters,  however,  are  relevant  in deter-
mining the marginal  effectiveness  of promotion.  To see this,  substitute (12)  and (13)  into
(14)  and  solve for A:
(15c)  A* =  b(E  - r)8/[V°r(: E +  ~)]  +  1,
where A* is the Lagrange  multiplier  in  cost-minimizing  equilibrium,  -= (PT  - T P)IP,
8  =  (KdBd  +  KfBX),  and  ;  =  (KdVd  +  KNX).  A* indicates  the net effect  on deficiency
payments  and promotion outlays  of a small increase  in the promotion budget,  assuming
the  budget increment is allocated to  the  two  markets optimally,  that  is,  in  accordance
with  (15a)  and  (15b). 6 Inspection of (15c)  yields  the hypothesis that the marginal  effec-
tiveness of increased  promotion  is  directly  related  to the  advertising  elasticities  and in-
versely related  to the  absolute value of the export and domestic demand elasticities.  The
effect  of policy parameters  on marginal  effectiveness  depends on program  participation
and eligibility  restrictions.  For example,  if all producers  participate  in the program  and
all production  is eligible for payments  t =  1, which implies  b  = 0. In  this case,  the  fr
term  drops  out  of  (15c)  and  marginal  effectiveness  is  invariant  to  the  target  price.  In
general, the more generous  the program provisions,  the lower  the marginal  effectiveness
of promotion. 7 The  conclusion  is consistent  with  Kinnucan,  Duffy,  and  Ding's analysis
which suggests  that protection  reduces  the incentive  to  promote.
Application
The allocation rules are applied to cotton to illustrate usefulness  and to determine whether
historic allocations  are  consistent with the cost-minimizing  solution.  The cotton industry
represents  a suitable case study because it is protected by a deficiency-payment  program;
the  industry invests  substantial funds in  domestic  and export  promotion;  and  the target
price  in  general  has  stayed  well  above  the  market  price.  Average  annual  government
outlays  for  cotton  price  support  between  1989  and  1993  was  $1.1  billion  (see  table  1
5A  reviewer  questioned  how  the allocation  rules  would  change  if (a) the trade  status  of  the  commodity  changed,  or (b)
the instrument  of protection  changed.  If the trade status  changed  from  a large  to  a small open-economy  situation,  promotion
would  have  no  effect  on the  market  price,  in  which  case  the  best  solution  is  not  to  promote  at  all  (Alston,  Carman,  and
Chalfant,  pp.  149-52).  If the  instrument of protection  changed  such that  the target prie was no longer  binding (free-market
situation), equations  (15a)  and (15b)  are  still applicable,  provided the large,  open-economy  assumption  is valid and producers
wish  to maximize  quasi-rent (Kinnucan  and  Christian).  Yet  a third scenario  is when  the law  of one-price  fails  to hold. This
might  occur,  for example,  if the  marketing  authority  has  monopoly  power  and  practices  price  discrimination.  In this case,
the  Dorfman-Steiner  theorem  applies,  and the  demand elasticity  enters  the decision calculus.  In particular,  the more  elastic
market,  ceteris paribus,  receives  the larger  allocation  (De Boer,  pp.  133-34).
6 As pointed  out by  a reviewer,  dL*I8dA  =  1 + A*,  so the  Lagrange  multiplier  is  interpreted  as  the net effect of  a  budget
increment  on deficiency  payments,  that  is,  net of the  incremental  cost of  the additional  promotion  outlay.  In this  sense,  A*
measures  the  "pure"  gain (or loss)  associated with a small  increase in  the promotion  budget.  As long  as A* < 0 and  IA*|  >
1, a unit increase  in  the promotion budget  results in  a pure  economic gain.
7Owing  to  space limitations,  a complete  analysis  to  support  this  statement is  not possible here.  However,  it is instructive
to consider the  effect of the fudge factor,  that is,  dA*/aT, for  the case  when  0 =  1. In this  case,  (15c) reduces  to A* =  (VT  '
- T6)/(VT).  Then,  aA*/dT  =  -8/(VT),  which  is  negative  by  assumption.  Thus,  as  the fudge  factor  increases  from  a small
positive fraction  to  its  upper bound of one  (implying  an  increasingly  less  generous deficiency  payment), the marginal  effec-
tiveness  increases,  as claimed.  Next,  consider  the conditions required  for an increase  in  promotion to  decrease  the combined
cost of protection  and promotion.  Here we find  that A* < 0  only if T8 > VT,  which upon substitution  and rearranging,  yields
V  < T  (KBJ + KB,)I(KN,  + KN,).  This expression  can  be made more  intelligible  by  noting  that if  r = Kd  =  1, then  VT'
< Bd/Nd.  The right-hand  side of this  expression  is  the Dorfman-Steiner  theorem.  Thus,  marginal  returns  are positive as long
as the promotion  intensity  is  less than  would be indicated  as  optimal by the  D-S theorem.
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Table  1.  Model  Parameters and Baseline  Values,  U.S.  Cotton Industry
Itema  Definition  Value
P  Domestic  market price  ($/lb.)  0.611
PT  Target  price  ($/lb.)  0.729
T  Domestic  price correction  factor  (T  =  (PT - DP)IP)  0.979
Q,  Domestic  production  (mil.  lbs.)  7,450
Proportion  of production  eligible for deficiency  paymentsb  0.85
Supply response  scaling  factor (S  =  (1  - O)P/[(PT + (1  - P])  0.1304
G  Govt.  outlays for price-support  deficiency payments  ($ mil.)c 1,089
K,  Domestic  share (Qd/Q)d  0.57
Kx  Export share  (Qx/Qs)d  0.43
A,  Total  outlays for domestic  promotion ($ mil.)
e 35.7
A,  U.S.  industry  outlays for export promotion ($ mil.)
f 5.2
ATP  Foreign third-party  outlays for export promotion  ($ mil.)
f 28.1
Ag  Govt.  outlays for export promotion  ($ mil.)f 17.1
Ax  Total outlays  for export promotion  (A,  + ATP  + Ag)  50.4
A°  Promotion budget  (AD  + A,)  86.1
Nd  Domestic  demand  elasticity  0.30
N,  Export  demand elasticity  1.00, 2.00
Bd  Domestic  advertising  elasticity  ?
B,  Export  advertising elasticity  0.120
E  Domestic  supply elasticity  0.30, 0.92
a Prices and  quantity  data refer to  average  values for  the  1989/90-1993/94  crop  years.  Source:  USDA/
ERS  1995.
b Estimated based on  crop yields and  actual deficiency  payments  as reported in USDA/ERS, April  1995
(tables  17  and 35).
cAverage  for  1989/90-1993/94.  Source:  USDA/ERS,  April  1995  (p. 50, table  35).
d Average  values for  1984-93.
e 1992  value. Source:  AD  $ Summary.
f 1992 value.  Source:  Cotton  Council  International.
outlays  for  cotton price  support  between  1989  and  1993  was  $1.1  billion  (see  table  1
footnotes  for  sources).  This  represents  24%  of  gross  farm  revenue  (exclusive  of the
production  subsidy).  Promotion  expenditures  in  1992  totaled  $86.1  million,  with  $35.7
million  going to domestic promotion and  $50.4 million to export promotion.  The export
promotion  expenditures  include  a  federal  subsidy  of $17.1  million.
The United  States  is considered  a  large  cotton exporter  because  its average  share  of
the  world  cotton  market between  1960  and  1993  was  27%  [U.S.  Department  of  Agri-
culture  (USDA),  World Cotton Situation]. Thus,  promotion-induced  changes  in the  de-
mand  for U.S.  cotton  are likely  to  increase  the market  price.  The  higher market  price
stimulates  local production by nonprogram producers  and may  encourage raw  fiber im-
ports,  which  would undercut  the profitability  of the promotion  investment.  The  import
response,  however,  is likely  to  be negligible  owing  to the  insulating  effects  of the defi-
ciency-payment  program.
To  implement  (15),  the  model  parameters  and  baseline  values  must  be  assigned nu-
merical  values.  The baseline  values  for domestic  price, domestic  quantity,  export quan-
tity,  export share,  and the policy parameters  (PT, r,  b) are based on USDA  data for the
1989-93  crop  years  as  indicated  in  table  1. The baseline  values  for  promotion  in  the
domestic  market ($35.7  million)  and  the export  market ($50.4  million)  pertain to  1992.
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The export-market  expenditure  includes the  subsidy ($17.1  million)  and funds provided
by foreign third-party  cooperators  ($28.1  million).
Values for the  demand and  supply elasticities  and the export advertising  elasticity  are
available  from past  research.  The derived  demand  elasticity  for cotton  in the  domestic
market  is  set  to  0.30,  Wohlgenant's  estimate,  which  is  confirmed  in  our  work  to  be
discussed  later.  The export  demand elasticity  is  set to  two  alternative  values,  1.00  and
2.00.  These  estimates  bound  the  "total"  export demand  elasticities  for U.S.  cotton ob-
tained  by Duffy,  Wohlgenant,  and  Richardson.  The domestic  supply  elasticity  is  set to
0.30,  an estimate  of the  "short-run"  response  used by  Duffy  and  Wohlgenant  in  their
study of export price  subsidies.  To  gauge  the longer-run  impacts  of supply response on
marginal  returns,  the  domestic  supply  elasticity  is  set  alternatively  to  0.92,  a  recent
estimate obtained  by Duffy,  Shalishali,  and  Kinnucan.  The export advertising  elasticity
is set to 0.12, the estimate obtained by Solomon and Kinnucan for U.S. cotton promotion
in the Pacific  Rim. No empirical  estimates  exist for the domestic  advertising  elasticity.
Estimation
Model
The domestic  promotion elasticity  was  estimated  using  an augmented  version of Wohl-
genant's  derived  demand model.  The basic  specification is
(16)  In Qd  = ao + a, In P,_  +  a2 In  n PR_4  + a 4 In P_  a  +  a5 ln(E/P*)
+  a6 In Ad_ 2 a7 n  Qdct-  +  j3=1 bj Djt +  Ut,
where t = 5,  6, ... , 72 (1977.I-1993.IV);  Qdt denotes per capita mill consumption of cotton
in  period  t;  Pt-4  denotes  the  domestic  farm  price  of cotton  in  period  t  - 4;  PR_4  is  the
wholesale  price of rayon  in period t  - 4; PP_ 4 is  the wholesale  price of polyester in period
t - 4; Pt denotes  the wholesale  price of imported  textiles  in period  t; E, denotes  per capita
total  expenditure  on cotton,  rayon, polyester,  and imported  textiles  in period  t; P*  denotes
the  Stone's price index,  that is, In P* =  w,  In P, + w2 In PR  +  w3 In P  +  w4  In P,  where
Wj  are expenditure  weights  such that  j4=  wj =  1; At_2  denotes total expenditures  on cotton
promotion  in the domestic  market in period t - 2; Dt are quarterly  dummy variables  spec-
ified  to take  the value of one in the  specified  calendar quarter and zero otherwise;  and u, is
a random disturbance  term. In this model, prices  and advertising  are expressed in real terms
through deflation by  the consumer price  index (1982-84  equals  100).
Equation  (16)  differs  from  Wohlgenant's  (annual)  model  in  that  a  lagged dependent
variable  is added to account for advertising  carryover  (Clarke; Lee and Brown); dummy
variables  are included to test for seasonality  in mill demand;  and  advertising  is added  as
a  shift variable.  In addition, rayon price is added to  confirm Lowenstein's earlier finding
that rayon is a  substitute  for cotton.
Following Wohlgenant, we specified the price variables for cotton, rayon, and polyester
with a four-quarter lag to account for forward contracts between mills and fiber suppliers.
Thus, the first four observations  are lost and estimation is based on 68 observations.  The
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textile  price  and total  expenditures,  which  reflect demand  conditions  at retail,  are  spec-
ified  contemporaneously.  Preliminary  testing  indicated  a  delayed  advertising  response.
In particular,  t-tests indicated that advertising  did not "take hold" until the second quarter
following  the initial expenditure.  Accordingly,  the advertising  variable  is  specified with
a two-period  lag. The double-log  specification permits advertising  to display diminishing
marginal  returns  (Simon  and  Arndt).
Advertising's  specification  as  a  shift  variable  in  (16)  is  consistent  with  Stigler  and
Becker's  hypothesis  that  advertising  acts  as  an  input in  the household  production func-
tion.  An  alternative  view  is  that  advertising  is  a  "taste  shifter"  that  affects  marginal
utility  (Theil).  The  latter view  implies that  advertising  should be  specified  as  an inter-
action term  with income  or price  (Quilkey;  Chang  and  Kinnucan).  To  test whether  ad-
vertising  has caused  the demand  curve to  rotate,  we specified. the own-price  coefficient
in  (16)  as  a linear  function of advertising:
(17)  a,  =  cl  +  c2 In Adt2.
Substituting  (17)  into  (16):
(18)  InQdt = c  t  Co  +  In P4 +  c2 In Adln P,_ 4 +  C3 In Pf4 +  c4  In Pp4 + c5 In PI
+  c6 ln(E/P*) +  c, In Ad,-2  +  c8 In Qdt - +  I  3=1 dj Djt +  vt.
The validity  of the  structural-change  hypothesis  is tested by forming  the hypothesis:
(19a)  HN:C2 =  0,  and
(19b)  HA: c 2 .
Hypothesis  (19)  represents  a  two-tailed  test that  can be implemented  with a standard  t-
statistic.
Data
The price  and  quantity  data for cotton,  rayon,  and polyester  were  obtained  from tables
15,  26,  7,  23,  and  27  of USDA's  Cotton and Wool: Situation and Outlook Report.8 The
price  data are raw fiber-equivalent  prices.  Price data for imported textiles were  obtained
from  table  3  of the  U.S. Department  of Commerce's  Survey of Current  Business. Pop-
ulation  data and  the  consumer  price  index were  obtained from  tables b-59 and  b-22 of
the  various  issues  of the Economic Report of the President (Council  of Economic  Ad-
visers).
The  advertising  data  were  obtained  from  Leading  National  Advertisers  (AD $  Sum-
mary), a commercial  service  that tracks  advertising  expenditures  in ten principal  media
for major brand advertisers.  The  advertising  data pertain to quarterly expenditures  listed
under Cotton Incorporated,  the industry marketing organization  responsible for domestic
promotion.  Because  data from  commercial  tracking  services  are prone  to measurement
error (Kinnucan and  Belleza),  preliminary  analysis  was performed to determine whether
a correlation exists between Ad and equation (16)'s error term. The Hausman  test (Kmen-
ta,  pp.  365-66),  using  advertising  lagged  one  and  two  periods  and  quarterly  dummy
8  The quantity  data for polyester  are adjusted by its share  in the noncellulosic category  (Ding).  Polyester market share data
were obtained  from table  5 of the article  "World Textile  Trade and  Production  Trends"  (Anson and  Simpson).
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variables  as  instruments,  failed  to  detect measurement  error. A  data appendix  with ad-
ditional explanatory  detail  is available  in  Ding.
Results
The t-value  for structural  change  was -1.367,  which  is  not large  enough  to  reject  hy-
pothesis  (19a)  at  the  5%  level.  This  constitutes  evidence  in  favor  of the  simple-shift
hypothesis  implied  by Stigler  and Becker's  theory  of advertising,  so  (16)  was  selected
as  the appropriate  specification.
Owing to  the use of quarterly data,  we tested for both first- and  fourth-order autocor-
relation  using the  Durbin m-test,  the preferred  test statistic  in the  presence  of a  lagged
dependent  variable  (Kmenta, p.  333). The test failed to detect first-order  autocorrelation;
however,  there  was  evidence  of fourth-order  autocorrelation.  Cochrane-Orcutt's  method
for  higher-order  autocorrelation  (Greene,  pp.  276-77)  was  used  to  obtain  generalized
least squares estimates.  Equation (16)  was estimated with (Model A) and without (Model
B)  the  seasonal dummy variables  to test whether mill demand  is seasonal.
The  models  show  good  explanatory  power  (R2 =  0.95)  and  most  of the  estimated
coefficients  are  significant  and  agree  in  sign with  economic  theory  (table  2).  The esti-
mated coefficient  of the lagged dependent variable  is highly significant (t-ratio  of eight)
and  is between  zero  and  one,  as  required  to  satisfy  stability  conditions.  The estimated
long-run own-price  elasticity,  which is calculated  by dividing the estimated cotton price
coefficient  by  one minus  the  estimated  coefficient  of the  lagged dependent  variable,  is
-0.30  for Model  A  and  -0.29  for Model  B.  The  close correspondence  between  these
estimates  and Wohlgenant's  earlier  estimate of -0.30 suggests that  the derived  demand
for cotton  is inelastic  and  stable  over time. (Because Wohlgenant's  estimate is based on
annual  data,  and  no lag  structures  were  specified,  it  may  be  interpreted  as  a  long-run
elasticity.)
The  estimated  coefficient  for rayon  price  is positive,  which  suggests  rayon is  a  sub-
stitute  for cotton.  This result  is consistent with Lowenstein's  finding. The estimated  co-
efficient for polyester price is negative, signifying  that polyester  is a complement.  Wohl-
genant, by contrast,  found polyester to be  a substitute. The difference  may be due to the
omission of rayon  price  in the earlier  specification. 9 Consistent  with Wohlgenant's  find-
ings, the estimated elasticities  for textile price and group expenditures  are positive, which
suggests  that an increase in  the price of imported textiles or consumer income  increases
the derived  demand for U.S.  cotton  fiber.
The  estimated  long-run  advertising  elasticity,  the  key  parameter  of  interest  in  this
study,  is  0.062  in  Model  A  and  0.066  in  Model  B.  Based  on  a  one-tailed  t-test,  the
estimated advertising  elasticity is significant at the 10% level  in Model A and the 0.005%
level in  Model B.  Because  cotton advertising  varies  seasonally, the lack  of precision  in
Model A's  estimate may be due to multicollinearity.  To test this, we removed the dummy
variables  and conducted  an F-test to determine if the reduced model differs from the full
model. As indicated in table 2, the computed F-value was 2.08, which is not large enough
to reject  the null hypothesis  that the  seasonal  dummy  variables'  coefficients  are jointly
9 A reviewer  suggested that  because cotton is  a more  dominant fiber now than in the past and that cotton-polyester  blends
are  common, the  relationship  between polyester  and cotton may have  changed from competitive  to complementary.
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Table  2.  GLS  Estimates (Corrected for Fourth-Order
Autocorrelation)  of Domestic  Mill Demand for  Cotton,
1976-93 Quarterly Data
Variable  Model  A  Model  B
Advertising  0.01967  0.02395
(1.32)  (3.16)
[0.062]  [0.066]
Cotton  price  -0.0952  -0.1055
(2.51)  (2.77)
[-0.30]  [-0.29]
Rayon  price  0.2236  0.2518
(2.39)  (2.66)
Polyester  price  -0.2686  -0.3053
(2.78)  (3.19)
Imported  textile price  0.1372  0.1595
(2.72)  (3.15)
Expenditure  0.1124  0.1295
(2.11)  (2.41)
Lagged dependent variable  0.6843  0.6390
(8.66)  (8.70)










2 0.955  0.950
Durbin  m-test for serial correlation:
First order  0.778  0.218
Fourth order  -2.232  -2.027
F-test: Model  A vs.  B  -2.0832a
Notes:  Figures in parentheses  are absolute values  of t-ratios.  Figures
in brackets  are  long-run elasticities.
aThe  probability  for 3  and  57 degrees  of freedom  is 0.1125,  which
means that Models  A and B  are  statistically equivalent.
zero.  This  result,  coupled  with  the  uniformly  higher  t-values  in  Model  B,  lead  us  to
accept the reduced  model  as  the preferred  specification.
The  advertising  elasticity  from  Model  B  of 0.066  may  be  compared  with  Solomon
and  Kinnucan's  estimate  of 0.12 for the export market and to  Dewbre,  Richardson,  and
Beare's  estimate  of 0.086  for Australian  wool  promotion in  the United  States.
Optimal Budget Allocations  for Cotton
With the missing elasticity  estimated, the optimal budget allocations  and marginal returns
to  increased  cotton promotion  can now  be  determined  using  equations  (15a)-(15c).  To
determine the optimal budget allocations,  we set Bd = 0.066, B,  = 0.12, and  "simulated"
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Table 3.  Optimal versus  Actual Allocation  of  Cotton Promotion Budget  (AT)  to the
Domestic  (Ad)  and Export (Ax)  Markets, 1984-93
Domestic  Export
Allocation  (A,)  Allocation  (Ax)
Optimal  Actual  Ratioa  Optimal  Actual  Ratioa
Year  AT  ($ mil.)  ($ mil.)  (%)  Agb  ($ mil.)  ($ mil.)  (%)
1984  12.7  4.2  7.5  180  1.6  8.5  5.2  61
1985c  14.9  5.3  8.4  158  1.7  9.6  6.5  68
1986  16.3  6.2  9.6  154  1.8  10.0  6.7  66
1987  25.8  10.1  11.0  108  7.1  15.7  14.8  94
1988  44.2  18.7  26.6  146  8.6  26.0  17.6  68
1989  27.7  10.6  11.0  104  8.8  17.1  16.7  98
1990  56.0  21.4  19.2  90  15.6  34.6  36.8  106
1991  68.5  25.0  18.5  74  18.7  43.6  50.0  114
1992  86.1  44.4  35.7  80  17.1  41.6  50.4  121
1993  77.8  36.0  32.4  90  15.2  41.8  45.4  108
a Actual divided by  optimal.
b Government  subsidy for export promotion.
c Owing  to an unusually  small export share  in this year (K,  = 0.23),  the  optimal  allocation is based  on
the  average  export  share for  1984 and  1986  (Kx  =  0.50).
(15a)  and  (15b)  using  export  share data for the period  1984-93.  This  10-year period  is
of interest because  federal  subsidies  for cotton  export promotion  increased  nine-fold  as
indicated in table  3. The  first increase occurred  in  1987 following  the implementation  of
the Targeted Export Assistance program (TEA). The replacement of TEA with the Market
Promotion Program (MPP)  in  1990  coincided  with  a second  round  of subsidy increases
so that by  1992  cotton was  receiving $17.1  million  to support  export promotion.
The heightened subsidies  are reflected in the budget allocations  (table 3). In particular,
prior to TEA, the industry overinvested  (relative to the optimum) in the domestic market
at  the expense  of the export  market.  Following  TEA,  budget  allocations  began to  shift
in favor of the export market.  With the inception of MPP in  1990  and the new round of
subsidy  increases,  budget  allocations reversed  their earlier pattern to  such an extent that
the industry  was  overinvesting  (relative  to  the  optimum)  in  the export  market.  The  al-
locative  errors  favoring  the export  market  (6%-21%), however,  are  less severe than the
earlier (pre-TEA)  allocative  errors  favoring  the domestic market (54%-80%). Thus,  one
might argue that the increased subsidies  were efficiency  increasing in the sense that they
encouraged  industry to  allocate its marketing  resources  in a more cost-effective  manner.
That  industry tends  to  underinvest  in  export  promotion  when  export  promotion  sub-
sidies  are  low  can  be  explained  by the  free-rider  problem.  The  free-rider  problem,  as
explained  by  Goddard  and  Conboy,  arises  when  the  promoted  product  is  viewed  by
importing  countries as  homogenous  across  import sources.  In this  case,  if one  country's
promotion  program  increases  demand,  all  importing  sources  experience  a demand  in-
crease  and  thus  benefit  from  the promotion  without incurring  the  cost.  The inability  to
capture the full benefit of export promotion may  act as a disincentive  to invest in export
promotion,  especially  if the promoting  country's  trade  share  is modest.  (Recall that the
U.S.  average  trade  share for cotton is 27%.)
Given  the  large  increases  in  promotional  spending  (from  $12.7  million  in  1984  to
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Table 4.  Benefit-Cost  Ratios for Increased  Cotton
Promotion under Alternative  Assumptions  about the
Export Demand Elasticity  (Nx),  the Export Advertising
Elasticity (Bx),  and the Domestic  Supply Elasticity  (E),
United  States,  1992
B,  = 0.120  B,  = 0.066
Length  of Run  N  = 2.00  N  =  1.00  N  =  2.00  N  =  1.00
Short run
(E = 0.30)  2.63  5.07  1.69  3.49
Long run
(E =  0.92)  2.32  4.31  1.46  2.92
Note: The B-C ratio indicates the net reduction in government outlays
for deficiency  payments and promotion per dollar increase in the pro-
motion budget,  assuming that the budget increment is allocated to the
domestic  and  export  markets  optimally,  that  is,  in  accordance  with
text equations  (15a)  and  (15b).
$86.1  million in  1992),  the  question  arises  whether  industry  (and, by  implication,  gov-
ernment)  is  overinvesting  in  cotton  promotion.  To  answer  this  question,  we  evaluated
the Lagrange  multiplier  [equation  (15c)]  at the higher expenditure  level  (AOl  =  86.1)  for
the parameter values given in table 1. Results indicate  that even at the higher investment
level,  the budget is suboptimal  from the standpoint of minimizing the combined cost of
protection  and promotion.  In particular,  for the baseline  values  of the export  advertising
elasticity  (Bm  = 0.12),  export demand  elasticity  (N,  = 2.00),  and supply  elasticity  (E =
0.30),  the  absolute  value  of the  Lagrange  multiplier  is  2.63.  This  means  that  if  the
promotion  budget  (AT)  was  relaxed  by  one  dollar,  and if  the budget increment was al-
located to the domestic and export markets optimally, that is, in accordance  with (15a)
and (15b),  the  extra  demand  associated  with  the $1  budget increment  would  cause  the
combined outlays for deficiency payments  and  promotion to  decline by $2.63.  This im-
plies,  for  example,  that  an  increase  in  subsidies  for export  promotion  would be  self-
financing  in that net  treasury outlays for price support and promotion  would decline  by
more than the cost  of the increased  subsidy.
Sensitivity  analysis indicates  that the Lagrange  multiplier is  sensitive to assumed val-
ues  for  the  demand  and  advertising  elasticities  but  relatively  insensitive  to  the  supply
elasticity  (table  4).  The  smallest  value  for  A* is  obtained  when  export  demand  and
domestic supply  are relatively  elastic  and the export market is relatively  unresponsive to
promotion.  For example,  if the export-promotion  elasticity  is reduced to 0.066,  the elas-
ticity estimated for the domestic market, Nx remains at 2.00,  and E = 0.92, the Lagrange
multiplier in absolute  value is 1.46,  which still supports the underinvestment hypothesis.
Reducing  the  export demand elasticity  to  1.00 increases  the Lagrange  multiplier  to be-
tween 2.92  and  3.49 if the export market is relatively  unresponsive to promotion  and to
between  4.31  and  5.07  if the  market is  relatively  responsive.  Thus,  it  appears  that  in-
creases  in  cotton promotion  can be justified on economic  grounds, provided  that  funds
are  allocated efficiently  and the current  program provisions  remain intact. 1 0
1 0Elimination  of program  provisions  called  for in the  1996  farm  bill makes  subsidies  for export  promotion  difficult to
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Concluding  Comments
A  basic theme  of this  article  is that nonprice  promotion  interacts  with government  pro-
grams  to  shape treasury  exposure  and that  welfare  gains  can be  achieved  (in  a  second-
best  sense)  if  promotion  funds  are  allocated  efficiently.  Allocation  rules  derived  for a
"large"  exporting industry protected by deficiency payments indicate that optimal market
allocations  are governed by just two basic parameters:  the advertising  elasticities  in the
domestic  and  export  markets  and  the  export  market  share.  This  finding  is  important
because  it indicates  that promotion  managers  need  not concern  themselves  with policy
parameters,  demand  elasticities,  or  supply  response  in making  "good"  decisions  about
fund  allocations.  The  required  information  is limited  to  parameters  that  are  readily  ob-
served  (export  shares)  or  that  can be  obtained  as  a  by-product  of program  evaluation
(advertising elasticities).
Protection  through deficiency payments  implies that producer benefits from promotion
are  nil  unless  promotion  increases  demand  sufficiently  to push  the market  price  above
the target price.1 Under these conditions, the major beneficiary  of promotion,  aside from
any potential  gains  or losses  to  consumers  and  foreign producers,  is  the American  tax-
payer. Thus, the public has a  stake in program effectiveness,  which leads naturally to the
cost-minimization  framework  adopted  in  this  study.  Besides  rules  to  guide  allocation
decisions,  the  framework  provides  information  that  should  be  useful  to  industry  and
government  in  determining  how much to  invest in promotion.  The investment  decision
is more complex  than the  allocation  decision in that  policy parameters,  demand elastic-
ities,  advertising  elasticities,  export  shares,  and  supply  response must  be taken  into ac-
count simultaneously.
Subsidies  for export  promotion  provide  incentives  for  industry to  divert funds  from
domestic  market  promotion,  which  will diminish  the  overall  economic  impacts  of the
program if the  subsidies  encourage  industry to  overinvest  in  the  u  e  e  ourage  u  n  eexport market.  In the
case of cotton,  however,  it appears  that subsidies for export promotion may be efficiency
increasing in that market allocations when subsidies are high more nearly match the cost-
minimizing  allocation  than  when  subsidies are low.  Still,  subsidies  of any  type promote
inefficiencies  unless market  failures  or negative  externalities  are  attenuated.  A full ac-
counting  of the  social welfare  implications of promotion subsidies must await additional
research.
[Received October 1995; final version received July 1996.]
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Appendix:  Second-Order  Sufficiency  Conditions
The second-order  sufficiency  conditions  for a minimum of the Lagrange  function  [equa-
tion (8)]  require  that the determinant of the bordered  Hessian matrix  H* be negative  in
sign, that  is,
0  1  1
(Al)  IH*  =  1  La  Lab  <  0,
1  Lba  Lbb
where  Li  is the  second-order  partial  derivative of equation  (8)  with respect to  domestic
(i, j  = a)  and  export  (i, j  = b) promotion  (e.g.,  Lab  = (a2 L/(aAd aAx)).  Performing  the
indicated  mathematical  operations  on (Al), the  sufficient condition  in algebraic  form is
(A2)  -Laa +  a Lab  +  Lobb  <  0.
Direct application  of inequality  (A2) to  (8)  results  in an  expression that  is too cumber-
some to  evaluate. However,  insight into the problem can be obtained by considering the
case in which  all production  is eligible  for deficiency  payments  (b  =  1) and  (for nota-
tional convenience)  the unadjusted market  price is used  to compute the  deficiency  pay-
ment (r  =  1).  In this case,  the Lagrangian function reduces  to
(A3)  L  = (P  - P)Q°  + A,  +  A,  +  A(A  - A  - A,),
where  Q°  is  the  (fixed)  level  of domestic  production  elicited  by  target  price  PT.  For
notational  convenience,  let  Pi  denote  first-  and  second-order  partials,  respectively,  of
price with respect to domestic and export promotion [e.g., Pab = (a2P/(aAd aAj)]. Utilizing
this  notation, L,  = -PiQ°  (e.g.,  Lab  = -PabQ).  Substituting these relationships  into (A2)
and dividing  through by  Q° yields
(A4)  Paa - Pab - Pba +  bb  <  0.
Whether  inequality  (A4) is true depends on how promotion's  price-enhancement  ability
is affected  by (a) the level of promotion in the  own market as  indicated by the signs of
Pa  and Pbb and  (b) the  level of promotion  in the cross market  as indicated  by the signs
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of Pab and  PJba  The own-market  effects in essence  are governed by the shape of the sales-
response  function,  which  is characterized  by diminishing  marginal  returns  (e.g.,  Simon
and Arndt).  Thus, a plausible hypothesis  is that  Paa and Pbb are  negative.
The  cross-market  effects  depend on  complementarities  between  domestic  and export
promotion.  One possibility is that  domestic  consumers  also see  advertisements  for U.S.
cotton in foreign countries  (e.g., Canada),  and this  increases their responsiveness  to the
domestic  promotion.  In  this  case,  Pab  >  0.  However,  given  the  geographic  separation
between  the  domestic  market  and  major  export  markets  [Pacific  Rim countries  histori-
cally have  accounted for the bulk  of U.S. cotton exports  and promotional  spending  (So-
lomon  and  Kinnucan)],  a more  plausible  hypothesis  is  that  advertising  effects  across
markets  are independent,  that is,  Pa  = Pb  = 0. In this  case,  Paa  +  Pb  <  0,  and dimin-
ishing  returns in the  separate  markets  are sufficient  to ensure that  the market allocation
rules given in  (15a)  and (15b)  do indeed minimize the  combined  outlays for promotion
and  protection.